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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENALTIES AS TO LITIGANTS
CHALLENGING SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
OF LEGISLATION
THE Governmental regulation of business which has been widely extended in
recent years through the medium of statutory and code legislation has, in most
cases, been generously supplemented by the enactment of penal provisions au-
thorizing the imposition of criminal punishment on those who violate that legis-
lation.' Consequently, it may frequently occur today that a business man is
confronted with some form of this regulation, such as a code and accompanying
penal provision, to which he objects, and that he desires to test the validity of
the same either defensively in criminal proceedings brought to impose on him
penalties for violation of the regulation, or in positive action brought by him to
secure equitable relief or a declaratory judgment. If litigation of this nature
1. See, e.g., §§ 3(f) and 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 19, 200,
15 U. S. C. A. §§ 703(f), 710(a) (1933).
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arises, two distinct phases of the legislation involved may be challenged-the
substantive regulation and the penal provision. A decision on the substantive
point in favor of the challenging litigant will afford him the complete relief de-
sired. But even if this decision is adverse, remedy may be afforded against appli-
cation of the pertinent penal provision to violations of the substantive regulation
which have occurred during the litigation. If the litigant commits such a viola-
tion, believing the legislation invalid, he may attack the constitutionality of the
penal provision which punishes his violaton in order to escape the penal conse-
quences of violation even in the event that the substantive legislation is upheld.2
Should such litigation arise, the constitutional issues involved in determining
the validity of the substantive regulation would be dear, having received ex-
haustive discussion. But the issues involved in a determination of the validity of
penal provisions are not so well defined. Relatively little attention has been
accorded the subject in the law reviews,3 and recent decisions dealing with -NRA
penalties reflect the great confusion which today exists in this field of law:5
Yet the increasing tendency to challenge the validity of the penal and other
provisions of the recovery program directs attention to the desirability of clad-
fying the issues which may be raised by a litigant who, contesting the constitu-
tionality of substantive regulations, may also wish to challenge the validity of
penal provisions.
The decisions disclose that the most frequently expressed ground for holding
a penal provision unconstitutional as to a litigant challenging the validity of
substantive and penal legislation is that the provision prevents resort to the
courts. Originating as dictum in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co.c and
receiving elaborate treatment in Ex parte Young 0 this explanation has been re-
peatedly given by the courts in declaring such penalties invalid. In practically
all of these cases so adjudicated, the penal provision challenged was attached
to newly passed legislation and imposed severe punishment for violation of the
same; and it was correctly assumed that the threat of these severe penalties
2. If the attack is successful, the remedy probably relieves against penalties for violations
occuring for a short period prior to litigation as well, but the cases are not dear on this point.
A penal provision is usually considered to be separable, so that its invalidity does not nulli-
fy the substantive provisions of the legislation. United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co.,
213 U. S. 366 (1909); Granada Lumber Co. v. Missippi, 217 U. S. 433 (1910); Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Richmond, 224 U. S. 160 (1912); Louisville and NahU31
Rr. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Com-
mission, 231 U. S. 457 (1913); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914).
3. The only article of importance is Hardwicke, Penalties as Affected By Good FailT
Litigation (1934) 33 Micn. L. Rav. 40.
4. One of these decisions indicated doubt as to the validity of Section 3(f) of NIRA with-
out arriving at any definite conclusion on the matter, Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v.
Watzek, S F. Supp. 689 (D. Ore. 1934), noted in (1934) 43 Y= L. 3. 827; another con-
sidered the in terrorem character of penal provisions as grounds for injunctive relief, Hart
Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934); and a third held the penal provision
to be dearly valid, United States v. Schechter, 8 F. Supp. 136 (E. D. N. Y. 1934), arid in
part, U. S. L. Week, April 9, 1935, at 747, col. 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. granted, 55 S. Ct.
651 (1935).
S. 183 U. S. 79, 99-102 (1901). However, cf. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Texas and Pacific
Ry. Co., 56 Fed. 529 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1892).
6. 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
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would probably be sufficient immediately to coerce those subject to the legisla-
tion into compliance. It was thought by the courts to follow that the penal pro-
visions, by thus securing immediate compliance, would prevent resort to the
courts to determine the validity of the new legislation and would thereby con-
stitute a denial of due process of law.7
In two minor instances it appears that this first ground of penal invalidity was
correctly applied in the decisions. The first of these instances occurred where
the challenged penal provision exacted immediate compliance, with the sub-
stantive regulation, of a nature which rendered litigation impossible. A state
statute whch revoked the license of a foreign corporation to do business within
the state upon its resort to the federal courts exacted a compliance which required
self-denial of the right to litigate and thus without quesion prevented resort to
the courts.8 The second instance concerned the penal provision which secured
immediate compliance of such nature as to make litigation unprofitable. Resort
to the courts was prevented by penalties which frightened parties into immediate
construction of underground storage tanks,9 extension of telephone lines and
facilities,' 0 and payment of extravagant claims;" for once the questionable duty
was performed, there obviously would not have been any profit in litigation, if
indeed a legal right to litigate still existed. Litigation, therefore, would not have
been undertaken.1
2
7. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123. 145-148 (1908); Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 659-667 (1915); Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920);
Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U. S. 339 (1920); F. C. Henderson, Inc. v. Railroad
Commission of Texas, 56 F. (2d) 218, 223 (W. D. Tex. 1932); see Cotting v. Kansas City
Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 99-102 (1901) ; cf. Ex Parte Wood, 155 Fed. 190 (C, C. W. D.
N. C. 1907), aff'd, Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205 (1908).
8. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922). It should be noted, however,
that even in the decisions dealing with these two instances, the litigants were not coerced into
compliance, nor prevented from resorting to the courts.
9. City of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), aff'd, 279
U. S. 582 (1929) (without mention of penalties).
10. Cf. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Town of Calhoun, 287 Fed. 381
(W. D. S. C. 1923).
11. Inter-Southern Life Insurance Co. v. McElroy, 38 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930);
cf. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354 (1912) ; Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165 (1914). But cf, Minneapolis
and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. (1889); Fidelity Mutual Life Assoclation
v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308 (1902); Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Rr. C. v. Jack-
son Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217 (1912); Supreme Ruling of the Fraternal Mystic Circle v.
Snyder, 227 U. S. 497(1913); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325
(1914); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35
(1922); Life and Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. McCray, 291 U. S. 566 (1934).
12. A marginal producer is frequently threatened with insolvency if NRA code provislong
are enforced; yet if he violates the codes and incurs even moderate penalties he will similarly
become insolvent. Cf. The Perkins Case, reported by Mark Sullivan, N. Y. Herald-Tribune,
Dec. 24, 1934, at 11, cols. 7, 8. A penal provision reasonable for the industry as a whole,
therefore, will prevent such a marginal producer's resort to the courts to test the validity of
the codes, for it will exact the producer's compliance, cause his insolvency, and consequently
make it financially impossible for him to litigate. A court, however, should never on the
theory that the penal provision prevents resort to the courts relieve this marginal producer
from at least moderate penalties. Otherwise, penal legislation considered reasonable for a
class would be held invalid because of exceptional individuals within that group.
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In all other circumstances, however, the penal provisions held unconstitutional
on this first ground of penal invalidity, did not in fact prevent resort to the
courts to determine the validity of new legislation. True, the severe penalties, by
exacting immediate compliance, prevented those subject to the legislation from
testing its validity in criminal proceedings, where a violation is a prerequisite to
the court's jurisdiction; 13 but they did not prevent resort by the litigants to
equity. A litigant is permitted to comply with legislation, thereby completely
evading the risk of paying penalties, yet sue for equitable relief.' 4 It has indeed
been said that no decision will be given in equity on the constitutionality of a
penal provision,15 but such a statement is clearly inaccurate, for since legal
prosecutions afford an adjudication of constitutionality only at the possible cost
of heavy accumulated penalties resulting from the prerequisite violations, the
remedy at law is inadequate. l' Therefore, injunctive relief is regularly granted.'7
13. Certain courts infer this to be the resort prevented. Allen v. Omaha Live Stock Com-
mission Co., 275 Fed. 1, 5, 6 (C. C. A. Sth, 1921); Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F. (2d)
715, 719, 720 (D. Conn. 1925); Mrarrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F. (2d) 541, 545 (D. Kan-.
1928); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F. (2d) 8S, 93 (C. C. A.
4th, 1930); Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 F. (2d) 734, 738 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Texoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 59 F. (2d) 750, 753 (W. D. Tex. 1932);
Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16, 19 (W. D. Ky. 1934). It would follow that thesa
courts intended "prevention of resort to the courts" to mean merely that the legal remedy
is inadequate, and that the validity of penal provisions and other legislation should b2 deter-
mined in equity on some appropriate, but different, grounds.
14. A litigant is not required to violate legislation to secure equitable relief. Allen v.
St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 553 (1913); Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U. S. 197 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Town of Calhoun, 287 Fed. 381 (W. D. S. C. 1923); New Hampshire Gas and Electric Co.
v. Morse, 42 F. (2d) 490 (D. N. H. 1930).
15. The cases usually cited as denying the right of equity to assume jurisdiction are
United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909); Grenada Lumber Co. v.
Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433 (1910); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Richmond, 224
U. S. 160 (1912); Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 293 (1913); Grand
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457 (1913); Ohio Tax Cases, 232
U. S. 576 (1914); Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277 (1915). The validity of the penal
provisions involved in these decisions was not passed upon, however, primarily b2cau:e the
prosecuting officials concerned had not been shown to have intended to enforce such penal
provisions against the complainants, and thus an essential prerequisite to equitable jurisdic-
tion, a threat of enforcement, had not been proved to exist.
16. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersy v. City
of Charlottesville, 42 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Texas, 59 F. (2d) 750 (W. D. Tex. 1932); cf. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S.
495 (1922); Allen v. Omaha Live Stock Cornmission Co., 275 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. Sth, 1921);
Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull, 7 F. (2d) 715 (D. Conn. 1925); City of Dayton v. City Ry.
Co., 16 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F. (2d) 541 (D. Kans.
1928); Oklahoma City v. Dolese, 48 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
17. Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920); Oklahoma Gin Co. v. O'la-
homa, 252 U. S. 339 (1920); Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 10 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1906), approved, Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53, 54 (1909) (as to penal-
ties); Kern Trading and Oil Co. v. Associated Pipe Line Co, 217 Fed. 273 (N. D. Cal. 1914);
City of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), aff'd, 279 U. S.
582 (1929) (without talk of penalties). Note the failure to apply the principle of prevention
of resort to the courts in Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co, 240 U. S. 342 (1916).
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Certainly, where a litigant brings an equitable suit to test the validity of legis-
lation, it would be unreasonable to give a decision only on the substantive regula-
tion involved, and require the state and litigant, in the event of a decision
holding the substantive regulation constitutional, to bear the additional expense
of a suit at law before the constitutionality of the penal provision could be
determined. Moreover, a litigant may now comply with legislation and sue for
a declaratory judgment, s as well as for an equitable decree; 19 and to secure the
former relief he need not even prove, as in equity,20 that a property interest is
affected 21 or that enforcement of the challenged legislation is threatened.22
There exists a second, more general ground, however, for declaring a penal
provision unconstitutional as to a litigant challenging the validity of newly
passed substantive and penal legislation, viz., that the penalty provided is so
excessive as to be unreasonable, constituting thus a denial of due process of
law.2 3 In the last analysis, most courts have decided the validity of penal pro-
visions on this basis. Some have made express findings relative to the excessive-
ness or unreasonableness of penalties.24 Many others have ostensibly declared
penal provisions invalid as preventing resort to the courts to test the validity of
18. This is now available in the federal courts. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934).
19. It appears possible to sue for both injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment in
the same suit. See BORCHARD, DEcLARAToRY Junl rSm (1934) 170, 171; cf. Tirrell v. J'ohn-
ston, 171 Ati. 641 (N. H. 1934).
20. Before the declaratory judgment, resort to the courts was possibly blocked in certain
cases by the inability of some litigants, desiring to test the validity of penal and substantive
legislation, to show essential prerequisites to equitable jurisdiction. Cf. Shredded Wheat Co.
v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 389, 120 N. E. 248 (1918). Certainly, however, where the courts
have desired to afford equitable relief they have experienced no difficulty in discovering a
prerequisite property interest to be affected, Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. (1915); Crane v.
Johnson, 242 U. S. 339 (1917) ; nor in evading the necessity of receiving proof that a threat
of enforcement exists. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925) ; Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
21. Cf. BoRaCEu,, op. cit. supra note 19, at 311, 391 et seq.
22. Id. at 47. Also note id. at 138, 277, 278. Typical declaratory judgment cases involv-
ing the constitutionality of legislation are State v. Grove, 109 Kans. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1921);
Little v. Smith, 124 Kans. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927); Pathe Exchange, Inc., v. Cobb, 202
App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (3d Dep't, 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274
(1923); Multnomah County Fair Association v. Langley, 140 Ore. 172, 13 P. (2d) 354
(1932) ; Utah State Fair Association v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926). The
declaratory judgment is also preferable to the injunction as a vehicle for testing the validity of
legislation, due to the fact that the former is obtained more quickly, and with leM cost to the
litigants. See Comment (1926) 12 IowA L. Rrv. 62. The courts will be less ready to grant
injunctive relief in the future, in all probability, on account of the adequacy of the remedy
of a declaratory judgement. Cf. Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W.
565 (1927).
23. An excessive penalty in Congressional legislation would probably fall within the pro-
hibition of the Eighth Amendment against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments,
24. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 212 U. S. 86 (1909) ; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340 (1913); St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. WVillana,
251 U. S. 63 (1919); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260
U. S. 35 (1922); United States v. Clyde Steamship Co., 36 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A, 2d, 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U. S. 744 (1930); Noble v. Carlton, 36 F. (2d) 967 (S. D. Fla. 1930); ef.
Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U. S. 659 (1907); Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502 (1915).
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new legislation; but these decisions are explicable only on the underlying grounds
that the legislation involved imposed serious losses on objecting parties and
that the penalties were thus unreasonable and excessive because they severely
punished such parties for maintaining the previous status quo while they sought
an authoritative decision on the validity of the new legislation.P Even those few
decisions correctly holding penal provisions to have prevented resort to the
courts have done so on the theory that a penalty is excessive if it is sufficiently
large to secure compliance with legislation of a nature to make litigation impos-
sible or unprofitable.26
Obviously, the determination of whether a penalty provided for by a penal
provision is excessive or unreasonable must depend primarily upon the particular
facts of each case. There are, nevertheless, four considerations which may be
said to have guided the courts in applying this flexible yardstick.
In the first place, a penalty is considered excessive only where the litigant has
reasonable grounds for belief in the invalidity of the substantive regulation
challenged.2 7 A penalty is frequently considered excessive where it severely
penalizes a litigant who believed legislation to be unconstitutional and who vio-
lated it in good faith until he was able to secure an authoritative decision on the
question; but the same penalty may be held valid if the litigant violates and
brings suit when the legislation is dearly constitutional. Thus, where the validity
of a statute or administrative order depends upon the existence of a fact which
can be determined only after an investigation of a very complicated character, a
reasonable doubt about the validity of the legislation can exist, and a penal pro-
vision which punishes the violation of such legislation before a court is able to
pass upon it may be held invalid as unreasonable.2 8 But a steamship company
has been held to have no reasonable ground for doubting the validity of an order
issued by the Interstate Commerce Comnission, and consequently penalties ac-
cumulating during litigaton brought by the company to test the validity of the
order have been recognized as having been constitutionally imposed. - 3
25. See, e.g., Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 662, 663 (1915); City
of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478, 486, 4S7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), afl'd, 279
U. S. 582 (1929) (without discussion of penalties). Decisions frequently stress the injustice
of imposing severe penalties in these circumstances, while lightly passing over or ignoring the
claim that resort to the courts was prevented. Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Co. v.
Danaher, 238 U. S. 482 (1915); Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co. v. AMcChord, 103 Fed. 216
(C. C. D. Ky. 1900); Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 150 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905),
approved, Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53, 54 (1909) (as to penalties); see
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Railroad and Warehouse Commision, 250 Fed. 387, 397
(D. Minn. 1922); United States v. Clyde Steamship Co., 36 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U. S. 744 (1930).
26. Moderate penalties, not sufficiently severe to coerce parties into compliance of a nature
to make litigation impossible or unprofitable, have been upheld. Minneapolis and St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1S89), and subsequent cases cited in note 11, stp'a.
27. Cf. Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 662, 663 (1915); Olahoma
Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 338 (1920); and other cases cited in note 25, s a.
28. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 148 (190S); Noble v. Carlton, 36 F (2d) 967, 959
(S. D. Fla. 1930). Examples of such legislation are rate-fixing orders and many NR&A. code
provisions.
29- United States v. Clyde Steamship Co., 36 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied,
281 U. S. 744 (1930).
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In the second place, a penalty is held excessive only where the litigant, having
reasonable grounds for belief in the invalidity of legislation, has promptly sought
a decision on the constitutional question.8° A litigant is considered to be entitled
to a short breathing-spell after legislation is passed in which to violate the sub-
stantive legislation involved without becoming subject to other than light
penalies. 3 ' But if the litigant violates and litigates after this period has ended,
he is held to be justly subject to the severe penalties imposed for such violations.
In the third place, the excessiveness of a penalty is determined by comparing
the severity of the punishment with the injury to the public arising from the
violation. Penal provisions attached to rate legislation, which impose punishment
grossly out of proportion to the damages resulting from the penalized violation,
are a denial of due process of law; 32 but such provisions punishing non-compli-
ance with tax statutes during litigation promptly brought to test the validity of
that legislation are valid, as failure to receive tax payments cripples the proper
functioning of the government 3
Finally, penal excessiveness is measured by determining the hardship its im-
position will work upon the individual litigant. A penalty is likely to be found
reasonable where payment of the same may readily be made because of the
profitableness of violation and the general financial condition of the violator,
8 4
or where the amount of the penalty imposed may be varied at the discretion of
the trial judge. 6
A penal provision, therefore, may be declared invalid as to a litigant challeng-
ing the constitutionality of substantive and penal provisions of legislation on the
ground that the penalty provided was excessive, and, in a few instances, that
resort to the courts to test the validity of the legislation was prevented. If either
ground is found to exist, the penal provision will be said to be unconstitutional
when applied to violations which have occurred during litigation, and collection
of penalties for such violations will be prohibited. The procedure resorted to by
the courts to restrain the collection of these penalties varies. At law the penal
30. Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651 (1915); Gulf, Colorado and Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58 (1918); cf. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry.
Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63 (1919); City of Marysville v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478
(C. C. A. 8th, 1928), aff'd, 279 U. S. 582 (1929) (without discussion of penalties).
31. Note carefully the language used in the decisions cited in note 25, supra.
32. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340 (1913).
33. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304 (1897). The litigant must
usually pay the tax, and then sue to recover it back. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict,
229 U. S. 481 (1913); cf. Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U. S. 122 (1922).
But cf. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Hooper, 278 U. S. 563 (1928). The penalty pro-
vided in legislation may usually be adequate to secure compliance with the substantive regu-
lation involved, if needed to prevent injury to the public. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and
Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63, 67 (1919); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co.
v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, 44 (1922); United States v. Clyde Steamship Co.,
36 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 744 (1930).
34. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86 (1909).
35. Noble v. Carlton, 36 F. (2d) 967 (S. D. Fla. 1930). Cumulative penalties are upheld.
United States v. Schechter, 8 F. Supp. 136 (E. D. N. Y. 1934), aff'd in part, U. S. L. Week,
April 9, 1935, at 747, col. 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. granted, 55 S. Ct. 651 (1935). For a
discussion of the cumulative penalty see Scribner, The Cumulative Penalty (1934) 14 B. U.
L. R v. 109.
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provision is simply held void and unenforceable.30 A declaratory judgment deals
with the penal legislation in similar fashion.3 7 But in equity, either the case is
left open after a decision adverse to the penal provision is given, and complainant
is assured of the right to secure a restraining order whenever an attempt is made
to assess against him unconstitutional penalties,38 or an injunction is issued re-
straining the application of the penal provision as to the particular violations
that have occurred during litigation. 9 By each of these methods of procedure
the penal provision is declared unconstitutional only as to the particular facts
involved in the case, and in a subsequent suit concerning a different fact situation
the penal provision may be upheld as valid: 0
OPERATION OF BINDING RECEIPTS IN LIFE INSURANCE
It is the practice of most life insurance companies to state in their applica-
tions that the contract of insurance shall not take effect until the application
has been approved by the company, the first premium paid by the applicant,
and the policy delivered.' In the absence of a contrary agreement, the pay-
ment of the initial premium and the delivery of the policy are usually con-
current acts, thereby creating a period between the signing of the application by
the applicant and the delivery of the policy during which no money has been
advanced to the insurance company, and no insurance is in effect. This in-
terval may be from five to thirty days or more, depending upon the time con-
sumed in an investigation and physical examination of the applicant, in passing
upon his application at the home office, and in the travelling of the application
36. St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Wygnne, 224 U. S. 394 (1912);
lissouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340 (1913); cf. Inter-Southern Life Insurance
Co. v. McElroy, 3S F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. sth, 1930).
37. But the federal act provides that application may subsequently be made for injunc-
tive or other relief, if necessary. 43 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934).
38. F. C. Henderson, Inc., v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 56 F. (2d) 218 (W. D. Tex.
1932).
39. Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U. S. 773 (1879); Oklahoma Operating Co. %
Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920); Kern Trading and Oil Co. v. Associated Pipa Line Co., 217 Fed.
273 (N. D. Cal. 1914); City of Mlarysvile v. Standard Oil Co., 27 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. Sth,
1928), aff'd, 279 U. S. 582 (1929) (without discussion of penalties). In rate litigation the
complainant carrier is frequently required to impound the charges in exces of that fixed by
law, until a decision is given on the validity of the rate itself. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer,
146 Fed. 150 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905).
40. For decisions holding thus at law, see Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Arderson,
233 U. S. 325 (1914); cf. Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Rr. Co. v. Jackson Vmnegar Co, 226
U. S. 217 (1912); (1931) 31 Coi L. REv. 319. In equity, the injunction suspands operation
of the penal provision as to such violations by the particular plaintiff as occur or have
occurred during litigation. Coal and Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley and Avis, 67 W. Va. 129 (1910);
Comment (1928) 26 MICH L. Ruv. 415; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 327.
1. A field study of insurance agreements was made in 1921 and it showed that such a
provision was the most usual one. Corn, THE Comxcrnra- or mr RIsi: r L Cu
oF A LIrF IissunsscE Pozcy (Pamphlet, 1921). See alho VA:cn, .a-moro Or TIM
LAW OF LnsuppasCE (2d ed. 1930) §§ 69, 70.
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and policy to and from the home office.2 And during this period the applicant
possesses the power to revoke the offer made in his application. A decision not
to carry any insurance, or to purchase insurance of a rival company instead,
may lead the applicant to exercise that power. Should he do so, the conse-
quence is a loss to the company to the extent of the amount expended for
such investigation and medical examination of the applicant.3 Moreover, even
if the company could retrieve its loss from the applicant, which it probably
cannot,4 the expense involved in the prosecution of each case, as compared
with the amount that would be recovered therefrom even if it were successful,
renders such suits inexpedient. Nevertheless, the aggregate of the individual
losses to the insurance companies may be large.
To avoid this loss, insurance companies seek to induce applicants to pay their
first premium at the time of the application, and in return for such payment
give them a slip generally described as a "binding slip" or "receipt."5 An
examination of a large number of binding receipts indicates that for purposes of
analysis they are best divisible into two categories. 6 Under one type of receipt,
hereafter called the first type, it is provided that any insurance effected shall,
by reason of the payment of the premium at the time of the application, be in
force from the date of the medical examination, provided the application shall
be "approved and accepted" as applied for, at the home office. 7 Another type
of receipt provides that the insurance shall be effective as of the date of the
medical examination, if the company shall be satisfied that on that date the
2. Most companies have only one office which can approve applications. Since the larger
companies write insurance throughout the country, the time required to send the applica-
tion to the home office may be as much as three to four days. See BULLOCK, BIND1N0
REcEnTs (Pamphlet, 1921):
3. This loss is particularly serious in thp smaller policy classes for which the overhead
costs are almost as large as in much larger policies. Sometimes, the company forces the
insurance agent to pay the medical fee if the applicant rejects the policy. The agent may
therefore be personally interested in avoiding such a loss.
4. See 1 CoucH, CYc.OPEDIA op INs-uRANcE LAW (1929) § 93.
5. Binding receipts are used extensively in commercial insurance. General discussions
of the legal,effect of binding receipts in commercial and life insurance will be found in 1
COOLEY, Bsxxrs ON THE LAW OF INsuRAcE (2d ed. 1927) 809-820; 1 Couca, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 91; PATTERsON, EssENTiALs or INSURANcE LAW (1935) § 20; VANcr, op.
cit. supra note 1, §§ 66, 67.
6. The division herein employed is best suited for analysis because these are apparently
the most prevalent types, and the companies employing them are sure that they represent
different types. They are also the two types that raise the most different and difficult
problems of interpretation. It is expected that the reader will have no difficulty in applying
the principles stated herein to various other types of receipts.
Other provisions besides those noted in the text are: no insurance shall be effected "unless
and until" the application is accepted; a contract of insurance shall be immediately created,
but is subject to subsequent disaffirmance; the agreement shall take effect as of the time
of approval by the medical examiner.
7. An example of this type of receipt is as follows: "Any insurance effected shall be in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the policy or policies applied for and shall
by reason of this payment be binding and in force from the date of the medical examina-




applicant was an insurable risk, and that the application was otherwise accept-
able under the company's regulations for the amount and plan of the policy
applied for.8 Under either type of receipt, by securing payment of the first
premium at the time of the application the company is virtually assured against
any loss which might otherwise result from a revocation by the applicant. For,
with the payment of the premium, the company obtains funds in hand generally
sufficient to reimburse it for its medical and investigatory expenses. And even
if the doubtful assumption were made that the applicant may have a right to
regain his premium by exercising his power to revoke his offer before its accept-
ance by the company,9 the prospect of a law suit to effect that repayment pro-
vides a sufficient deterrent to a revocation. 10 Indeed, the absence of this ques-
tion in the appellate records indicates that the issue of whether the applicant
may regain his premium is seldom, if ever, litigated.
The issuance of binding receipts by insurers to applicants who pay their first
premiums at the time of application raises a number of questions as to the
effect of such receipts upon the legal relations of the parties. These problems
arise in three situations: first, the effect of the binding receipt upon the obliga-
tion of the insurance company when the object of the insurance, the applicant,
either dies or suffers an adverse change of physical condition prior to the accept-
ance of the application by the company; second, its effect upon the determina-
tion of the time from which will run the period stipulated in policies, during
which the company may contest the validity of a policy on grounds, among
others, of misrepresentation or fraud practiced by the insured at the time of
the application; third, its effect in determining at what time a policy lapses for
nonpayment of premiums. These questions may be answered differently, accord-
ing to whether the first or the second type of receipt is involved.
Effect of Death or Change of Health Prior to Acceptance. In the absence of
a binding receipt, even though the applicant is an insurable risk at the time of
the medical examination, if he dies after that time and before the company
has accepted his application and delivered the policy, it is obvious that the
8. The following is an example of this type of receipt: "The insurance contract applied
for shall be in force, subject to the provisions of the Company's standard policy form
therefor, from the date of the medical examination herefor, provided the Company shall
be satisfied that on that date the applicant was insurable as a standard risk in accordance
with the practices of the Company governing the acceptance of risks, and that the applica-
tion was otherwise acceptable under the Company's regulations and underwriting prac-
tices for the amount and plan applied for."
9. The obligation of the applicant, and his power of revocation depend upon the terms
of the particular receipt. Some specifically state that the applicant agrees to forfeit the sum
paid as liquidated damages upon his refusal to accept the policy. See Muhlbach v. Omaha
Life Ins. Co., 107 Neb. 206, 185 N. W. 447 (1921); Albers v. Security Mutual Life Co., 41
S. D. 270, 170 N. W. 159 (1918). But see Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 172
Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225 (1927). If no provision is made in the receipt, it would sEem
that the applicant might revoke prior to its acceptance by the company. See Whecloc
v. Clark, 21 Wyo. 300, 131 Pac. 35 (1913).
10. The use of the binding receipt is most often found among the poorer Ldar-zs of
policy holders. Their policies are for relatively small sums and the first premium would




company would not be bound." But even if a binding receipt of the first type
be issued, making the obligation of the company conditional upon "acceptance
and approval" by the company, most courts have generally felt themselves
constrained to reach the same result on the ground that the express condition of
acceptance has not occurred.12 Some courts, perhaps feeling that the language
of the receipt is inconclusive of itself, have reasoned that no contract could be
created in this situation, since the "subject matter" of the contract, namely, the
offeror's life, has ceased to exist, and, moreover, the application, being a mere
offer, is terminated by the death of the offerer.' 3 Following this line of reason-
ing, unless the application is accepted during the life of the insured, no liability
of the insurance company could be created.
In two cases, however, where the insured, who bad been an insurable risk
at the time of the medical examination, died before acceptance by the company,
the first type of receipt was interpreted against the company, and the bene-
ficiary allowed the full value of the policy, on the theory that the company
would otherwise have received a premium for a period during which it assumed
no risk.14 And in another case, involving a receipt unlike either of the two
types, and having no explicit provision for interim insurance, the court, influ-
enced by similar considerations, likewise held that there was an agreement for
interim insurance.'
5
Although the second type of receipt has been subjected to slight judicial re-
view, its legal effect is reasonably certain. Under its terms, companies are liable
to beneficiaries even though the application had not been accepted prior to the
death of the applicant, if the applicant is found to have been an insurable risk
as of the time of the medical examination, and the applicant should otherwise
have been acceptable for the amount and plan applied for.1' The fact that
11. Rushing v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, 224 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
This rule has been upheld even when there was a prior payment of premium. Munhall v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 327, 150 Atl. 645 (1930). Nor does an acceptance and delivery
in ignorance of the applicant's prior death affect this rule. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
James, 228 Ala. 383, 153 So. 759 (1934); cf. Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed.
689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892). A difficult question is raised, however, in determining what con-
stitutes delivery. See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 70.
12. Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 5th, 1897); Pace v. Provi-
dent Savings Life Assurance Society, 113 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902) (receipt not given);
Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 73 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Cook-
sey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 73 Ark. 117, 83 S. W. 317 (1904); Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S. W. 1026 (1911); Olson v. American
Central Life Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 511, 216 N. W. 225 (1927) ; Muhlbach v. Omaha Life Ins.
Co. of Omaha, 107 Neb. 206, 185 N. W. 447 (1921); Beaty v. Southland Life Ins, Co., 28
S. W. (2d) 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Field v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 77 Utah 45,
290 Pac. 979 (1930).
13. See Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892); Braman
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 73 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
14. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Howard, Ohio Court of Appeals, First App. Dis-
trict (1935) (unreported); Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 41 Vash. 228, 83
Pac. 116 (1905).
15. Albers v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S. D. 270, 170 N. W. 159 (1918).
16. Reynolds v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Ia. 76, 176 N. W. 207 (1920).
This view is further strengthened by the companies' interpretation of these receipts. See text
infra.
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the binding receipt purports to give the company a power to reject the applica-
tion if it is not "satisfied" that the applicant was an insurable risk as of the
date of the medical examination does not empower it to reject an application
arbitrarily and without a reason other than that the applicant had died previous
to the issuance of the policy.17 However, if the company rejected the applica-
tion, or issued a policy different than that requested, which is in effect a re-
jection, prior to the applicant's change of condition, or its knowledge thereof,
it has been held that the company is not liable.' 8
Similar consequences have followed from the two types of receipts when an
interim change of the applicant's physical condition occurs. Companies gen-
erally provide, and courts have held, even in the absence of an express provision,
that if the applicant's health has been, to his own knowledge materially impaired
before the policy is delivered, then the company is not bound by its subsequent
delivery of the policy unless, knowing of the insured's health, it waived this
condition.'9 However, when a binding receipt, even of the first type, has been
issued, and the application has been accepted, it would seem that the company
may not avoid liability on the ground of later discovery of evidence to the effect
that the applicant suffered an adverse change of health between the time of
application and acceptance. 0 For, acceptance by the company being stipulated
as the condition precedent to the creation of rights in the applicant and that
condition having occurred, the company will be deemed obligated thereafter.
But if the change of condition becomes known to the company before acceptance,
it may reject the application, otherwise satisfactory, solely because of such an
interim change.2 ' Under the second form of receipt it would seem incumbent
upon the company to accept the application if the applicant was a satisfactory
risk at the time of the medical examination, regardless of any subsequent change
17. C. Reynolds v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 76, 176 N. W. 207
(1920); Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States, 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424
(1922).
18. State v. Robertson, 191 S. W. 989 (Mo. 1916); cf. Field v. Missouri State Life Ins.
Co., 77 Utah 45, 290 Pac. 979 (1930). Rejection may consit of a counter offer wherein
the company offers the applicant a policy for a higher premium or different plan. Insurance
Co. v. Young's Administrator, 90 U. S. 85 (1874); Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York, 115 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Kempf v. Equitable Life A--ur. Society of
United States, 184 S. W. 133 (Mo. App. 1916); Field v. Mfsouri State Life Ins. Co., sup
When the first type of receipt is employed there need not be a return of premium to
applicant prior to death, in order to avoid company's liability. Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of New York, =upra; Brancato v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 35 F. (2d) 612
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
19. Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 227 U. S. 311 (1928); Adamos v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 278 (W. D. Pa. 1933); McKenzie v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 26 Ga. App. 225, 105 S. E. 720 (1921); VAxcE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351; Comment
(1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1503. But see Weber v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 284 Ill.
326, 120 N. E. 291 (1918).
20. De Cesare v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 278 Ma.. 401, 180 N. E. 154 (1932); Grier
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 132 N. C. 542, 44 S. E. 28 (1903).
21. See Grier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 132 N. C. 542, 545, 546, 44 S. E. 28,




in physical condition, thus reaching the same result as in the case of the appli-
cant's intervening death
22
Incontestability. Life insurance policies uniformly contain an incontest-
ability clause which limits the time during which the insurer may contest its
liability under a policy upon the various grounds which have been held to justify
a recission of the contract.23 Some insurance companies further add that they
will not be bound if the insured commits suicide within a stated period after
the agreement is created.2 4 Ordinarily these periods will begin to run from
the date the policy takes effect.2 5  But when a binding receipt of either type,
relating the insurance back to the date of the examination or application is
issued by the agent, it is generally held, in the absence of a specific contrary
provision, that the period of contestability and that relating to suicide begin
from that earlier date.2 6  This holding is in conformity with the rule accepted
in most states that a company may antedate its contracts if the parties so
agree.27
Forfeiture. If a life insurance premium is not paid at the time specified in
the policy, the insured's rights under the contract of insurance may be declared
forfeited by the company. Forfeitures, however, are disfavored by courts, and
consequently they often seek to delay the date when the company is privileged
to cancel the insurance for nonpayment of the premium. 28 Thus, when the
initial premium is paid prior to the effective date of insurance, some courts,
in order to give the insured the benefit of a full period of insurance paid for,
have held that the date of forfeiture will be calculated from the date the policy
actually took effect, rather than that from the date of the payment of the first
22. Such a conclusion would seem to follow from the rule in regard to interim death.
In the absence of specific provision, delivery of the policy is unnecessary, Lueck v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 184, 240 N. W. 363 (1932); Fortin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 185 Minn. 523, 241 N. W. 673 (1932). This rule has been followed even when, due
to some mistake a receipt was not issued. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Abromietes, 254
Mich. 622, 236 N. W. 769 (1931).
23. The maximum period of contestability is generally fixed by statute, and contesta-
bility is usually limited to one or two years. See VAxc, op. cit. supra note 1, § 231.
24. See, for example, Schwartz v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928) ; Narver v. California State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 294 Pac. 393 (1930).
25. Date of "issuance" is sometimes designated as the date from which the policy should
take effect and contestability shall run. The problem of determining date of issuance Is,
however, difficult. See CoxE, op. cit. supra note 1; Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. RLv, 1503.
26. Schwartz v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 25 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); cf. Whit-
ney v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 47 F. (2d) 861 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Anderson v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 164 Cal. 712, 130 Pac. 726 (1913). Contra: Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Prescott, 115 Fla. 365, 156 So. 109 (1933). A similar rule has
been followed in cases of special interim insurance contracts in which a special premium is
paid for insurance covering periods prior to the issuance of the policy. Jefferson v. Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 260 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Narver v. California State
Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 294 Pac. 393 (1930); Krebs v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co.,
249 Pa. 330, 90 AtI. 91 (1915) ; see PATso-, op. cit. supra note 5, at 73; VANcE, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 825.
27. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1923)
is the leading case affirming the validity of such contracts.
28. For a discussion of forfeiture, see VANcE, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 83, 84.
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premium.P Since some of these courts do not wish to decide contrary to the
terms of the contract, they have achieved this result by finding some ambiguities
in the contract of insurance and then adopting the well established principle
that an insurance agreement will always be construed against the companyS °
In other instances, however, such a justification has not been thought necessary;
the decisions avoiding forfeiture were based upon the ground that, despite the
express terms of the contract, insurance companies must give the insured the
full value of the premium paid.3 '
This same attitude of seeking ambiguities in order to give the insured a full
period of insurance, and to delay the forfeiture, has been carried over to the
few cases of forfeiture in which binding receipts are involved. In two cases
involving policies which provided that the premiums should be paid from a
date fixed in the binding receipts, which was earlier than the date the policy
was delivered to the insured, the courts, in order to avoid a forfeiture, decided
that the effective date of the policy was the date of the delivery, and that the
insured was entitled to a full period of insurance from that aate.32 They were
thus able to extend the period of effective insurance, and consequently the date
of forfeiture for non-payment of premiums, sufficiently to hold that there was
insurance at the time of the insured's death, so that the beneficiary was entitled
to collect thereon. And these results may be indicative of the possible course
which some courts will take in enforcing the first type of receipt. But under
the second type of binding receipt, the time of forfeiture would probably be
determined from the date of the medical examination as provided in the re-
ceipt, for the applicant may properly be considered insured from that date.
II
The relatively few decisions of appellate courts interpreting the effect of
binding receipts can hardly be thought to reflect the actual business practice of
companies, since the tactics of only the less liberal companies generally appear
in appellate records. A survey of the practice of many of the larger companies
reveals that a large and increasing number of companies employ the second form
29. See notes 30, 31 infra. Contra: Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Matthew, 33 F.
(2d) 899 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Tolbert, 55 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A.
10th, 1932); WVolford v. National Life Ins. Co. of the United States of America, 114
Kan. 411, 219 Pac. 263 (1923).
30. McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 U. S. 25 (1901); Prudential In. Co.
of America v. Stewart, 237 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); Stincbcombe v. New Yor!: Life
Ins. Co., 46 Ore. 316, 80 Pac. 213 (1905). For an attempt to reconcile the casas and an
explanation of how ambiguity may be eliminated, see P, %TnSo,., op. cit. supra note 5, at 73.
31. Chestnut v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 203 Mo. App. 130, 232 S. W. 203 (1921);
Bigalke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore, 34 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Mo. App. 1931). This
view is, however, contrary to the weight of authority.
32. See Johnson v. American Central Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind, 212 Mo. App.
290, 249 S. W. 115 (1922); Lyke v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 41 S. D. 527,
171 N. W. 603 (1909). Weight was put by these courts on the fact that the application
stated that the policy would not be effective until delivery. This provision was said to
contradict the binding receipt. And it followed therefrom that, in the presence of an
ambiguity, the contract of insurance must be interpreted against the insurer.
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of binding receipt.33 Under this type of receipt, these companies consider the
effective date of the policy to be the date of the medical examination or of the
application, and deliver the policy of insurance although there has been an
adverse change of physical condition after the medical examination, but before
acceptance, provided they are satisfied that the insured was an acceptable risk
at the time of the medical examination. 4 And even if death occurs during that
period, the policy will be paid. Consistent with these practices, the period of
contestability and the date of forfeiture are also reckoned from that time. How-
ever, a number of companies still employ the first form of receipt. Most of
these companies date the policy as of the date of the receipt, and require the
premium to be paid from that date. Moreover, they claim that under their
binding receipts the annual due date for payment of premiums, and therefore
the' date of forfeiture is to be calculated from the time of the application. How-
ever, these companies retain the right to reject the application because of any
change in physical condition before acceptance; so that, clearly, the applicant
is not insured before the date of acceptance. Moreover, even though a policy
is accepted and delivered, if a change in physical condition had occurred which
was unknown to them, they would contest their liability under such a policy.
Similarly, if the applicant's death intervenes, they do not consider themselves
bound to pay the beneficiary.
Thus, it may be seen that the second form of receipt gives the applicant cov-
erage from the time of the medical examination, which is virtually equivalent
to that which the company would grant under a regular policy issued on that
date. For this reason, it seems fair that the company should exact a premium
from that date. Under the first type of receipt, however, there can hardly be
said to be any insurance in effect from the time of the medical examination to
that of the acceptance of the application. Still, it is true that some advantages
do accrue to the applicant by reason of the binding receipt of the first type.
Thus, the period during which the company might contest the policy on the
grounds of fraud is rendered shorter in some cases because it begins from the
date of the medical examination rather than that of the issuance of the policy30
33. In order to ascertain the practices of companies, a questionnaire was addressed to
twenty-five of the largest companies in the United States. Sixteen companies replied
thereto. It was found that twelve of these sixteen used the more liberal, second type.
The statistics do not represent an accurate picture of the relative use of the different
types, and the opinions of insurance counsel varied as to which type of receipt is more
commonly used. But a comparison between the answers received from specific companies
and the early types of receipts used by these companies as they appear in case material
indicates a swing in favor of the more liberal type. In fact, one counsel stated that his
company was now contemplating such a change. It is important to note, however, that
some of the largest companies in the country continue to use the old forms; this factor
affects the relative frequency of its use.
34. Some companies issue non-medical insurance, and their practice would vary ac-
cordingly.
35. Of the four employing this receipt, one nevertheless followed the more liberal prac-
tice. Judging by the cases available, its change of attitude is of recent date. On the
whole such a procedure seems inadvisable since the risk of an adverse decision in the case
of forfeiture for non-payment of a subsequent premium is taken.
36. But some companies have sought to date the period of contestability from the date
of acceptance even when a binding receipt has been issued. See Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Prescott, 115 Fla. 365, 156 So. 109 (1933).
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Furthermore, due to the fact that where the binding receipt is used, the policy
is dated as of the time of the medical examination, the premiums may in some
instances be reduced because the applicant may, as of that date, be considered
a year younger, according to methods used by insurance companies, than if his
age were reckoned from the date of delivery of the policyP7 Then, too, in a
number of jurisdictions regardless of whether a binding receipt is issued, the
mere payment of the premium at the time of the application obligates the com-
pany to pass on the risk within a reasonable time. If their failure to do so
leaves the application unrejected at the time of the applicant's death, the com-
pany will be liable to the decedent's administrator for the amount of the in-
surance applied for, providing the decedent had been an insurable risk during
that reasonable time. s And finally the applicant may be said to derive a slight
benefit from the fact that under the binding receipt he will be insured from the
date of acceptance, rather than that of delivery, as would most likely be the
case in the absence of a binding receipt. Hence to the extent of the time in-
tervening between the acceptance of the application and the delivery of the
policy, the applicant gains an added period of protection over that enjoyed in
the absence of the receipt. But despite these various benefits, the fact remains
that the applicant does not receive the main object for which a premium is
paid and which the language of the receipt may lead him to expect, namely,
insurance from the date of payment of the premium.
To some courts, this latter fact of itself has served to brand the first type of
receipt as unfair. They have therefore, as previously indicated, adjudged the
insurance company liable, upon the death of the applicant prior to acceptance
by the company to pay the amount of insurance applied for, whenever the
terms of the receipt could be given such a meaning. Another factor, while not
articulated by these courts, might tend to accentuate the element of unfairness
involved in this type of receipt. Many insurance agents who are unacquainted
with either the legal significance of the first type of binding receipt or the actual
practice of their companies, and even those agents who are acquainted with
their company's practice, may, in an endeavor to induce the immediate payment
of the first premium, inform the applicant that he obtains immediate insurance
by securing the company's binding receipt. 0 Since the language of the receipt
is somewhat legalistic in form, and therefore difficult for the layman to compre-
hend, it is not unlikely that the applicant may, in the absence of more expr t
37. Insurance companies urge this as an important reason for the employment of a
binding receipt. There is no doubt but that the receipt is used in some cases bcaua
of this factor. Another advantage somewhat similar appears in cases where the applicant
has almost reached the non-insurable age and it is necessary to date the policy back to
make him insurable.
38. The leading case is Duffie v. Banker's Life Ins. Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1037
(1913); see VA.,cE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 64. Contra: Swentusky v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co. of America, 116 Conn. 526, 165 AUt. 6S6 (1933).
39. In fact, the question of agents' false representations in regard to the recelpt has
been litigated a number of times. Beaty v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 85
(Tex. Civ. App., 1930); Field v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 77 Utah 4S, 290 Pac. 979
(1930); Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. 1, 273 Pac. 667 (1929). One in-




opinion to the contrary, accept the agent's representation. This possibility,
coupled with the fact that the insurance company is exacting an unearned pre-
mium if it does not become liable from the time of the payment of the initial
premium, may well serve to explain the adverse attitude of these courts towar.q
the insurance company using the first type of receipt.
Regardless, however, of whether these courts' understanding of "justice" is
correct, their attitude has nevertheless led lawyers to believe that other courts
which have not adjudicated the issue of the legal effect of the binding receipt
of the first type, will also enforce a "just relationship." But since insurance
companies are willing to support an opposing view in an attempt to uphold
their contracts, as they understand them, litigation necessarily results. It is
this consequence, perhaps more than that of unfairness in the terms of the con-
tract, that is thoroughly undesirable, since it conflicts with the recognized pur-
pose of life insurance. Policies are carried by many people with limited re-
sources. For such individuals, court action, with its attendant uncertainties,
costs, and postponed payments, naturally is a serious handicap, since it may
exhaust much of the benefit to be gained from an insurance policy. And since
life insurance is often bought to protect the otherwise impecunious dependents
of the insured, the necessity of legal action, regardless of who is finally success-
ful, immediately destroys a large part of the possible benefit of insurance.
Such a condition would seem socially undesirable. But its elimination will
probably depend upon whether companies using the first form of receipt will
substitute a more clearly expressed receipt, frankly stating in terms plain even
to a layman that the company is bound only as of the date of acceptance, or
will adopt the second type of binding receipt, providing for the assumption of an
insurance risk by the company from the date of the medical examination. Or-
dinarily, the only uncertainty which might give rise to litigation under the latter
type of receipt would be uncertainty as to the question of fact, whether the
applicant was an insurable risk as of the time of the medical examination.
40
At the same time, the adoption of the second form of binding receipt would
eliminate the question of possible misrepresentation or non-disclosure arising
under the first form of binding receipt.
Past experience has convinced many companies, particularly the larger and
more reliable ones, that less stringent agreements, involving fewer legal com-
plexities and defenses, better serve their own interests in the long run. It may
be expected therefore, that companies still employing the first form will profit
by that experience, and change their receipts as well as their practice to conform
to apparently more just methods of doing business.
40. Some companies, however, might object to the adoption of this receipt on the
ground that if the insured dies before the application has been rejected, they might be
forced to pay even though the applicant would not ordinarily be considered a good rlskl,
because court and jury are not only incompetent to decide the applicant's physical con-
dition, but will tend to favor the insured or his beneficiary. This objection, although
serious, may, if necessary, be overcome by another alternative,-that of employing a
receipt, as some companies do, which becomes effective for all purposes from the date of
the acceptance. Such a receipt would naturally be less advantageous to both parties;
but it is the only apparent method of avoiding all the objections raised against the first
type without being unfair to the applicant.
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] COMMENTS
FUNCTIONAL APPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
RULES IN TORT CASES
TH=EE jurisdictions have recently refused to permit a recovery in suits
arising out of an injury suffered by a wife through the negligence of her hus-
band, where the accident occurred in a state which did not allow such inter-
spousal *actions, although the state of the forum did recognize such a cause
of action.' Another jurisdiction denied recovery where the injured party
married the tortfeasor before bringing the suit.2  In the most recent case,
Gray v. Gray, counsel for the plaintiff presented an extensive argument against
the holdings of the previous cases, and the opinion of the court discussed the
theories and arguments at length. Its conclusion, however, was that the rule
that the law of the place of the injury must govern tort actions is now too
well settled to permit any deviation. Therefore, since the accident occurred
in Maine, where a wife may not sue her husband in tortP the New Hampshire
court held that New Hampshire, the state of residence and the forum, could
not allow any recovery.4
It is one of the most firmly established rules of the conflict of laws that the
lex loci delicti governs all substantive questions in tort actions, determining
whether or not an action exists and what facts give rise to a right to damages.Y
1. Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Howard v. Howard, 200 N.
C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931) ; Gray v. Gray, 174 Atl. 508 (N. H. 1934).
2. Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (1931), noted in (1931) 31 Cor.
L. REv. 884; (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1138; (1931) 29 Mic. L. REv. 1072; (1931) 79
U. oF PA. L. REV. 804.
3. Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Mle. 280, 161 At]. 669 (1932).
4. In New Hampshire, a wife may sue her husband in tort. Gilman v. Gilman, 78
N. H. 4, 95 AtL. 657 (1915).
The court in Gray v. Gray discussed the doctrine of renvoi, but rejected it
on the correct assumption that it has never been applied in American courts. See
Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law (1910) 10 Cor. L. Pmv.
190, 327. If this doctrine had been employed, the New Hampshire court would have had
to examine not what a Maine court would do with a wholly domestic inter--pousal tort
action, but how it would have treated a case where one of the operative facts concerned
a foreign jurisdiction. The operative fact in this case was that the parties were residents
of New Hampshire, where they could sue each other. See Cook, The Logiral ard Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA=n L. 1. 457, 469. However, this fact prob-
ably would not affect the result, since the law of the place of the accident has been held
to govern the incidents of a status, though the domiciliary law determines the status
itself. See Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 16, 138 So. 414, 415 (1931); (1932) 16 .n,-;.
L. REv. 172.
5. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 At]. 691, 692 (1928); Fitzpatrick v. Inter-
national Ry. Co., 252 N. Y. 127, 135, 169 N. E. 112, 115 (1929), noted in (1930) 39 Y=r.
L. J. 901; Mlosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F. (2d) 364, 367 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), noted
in (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 449; (1932) 77 A. L. R. 1103; BzE.r, Su ,_um or mu
CoNecr or LAws (1902) § 86; Goowac:, HANnoom or = Coru-cr or Lws (1927)
188; Srolty, CommrNTAams ox THE CoNrrcr or Lws (7th ed. 1872) § 558; RzsrThmi- Ia,
Corxacr or LAws (1934) §§ 377-379.
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Questions of procedure are said to be regulated by the lex fori.0 Sometimes,
however, matters that are normally considered procedural are said to be so
bound up with the substantive right that they become "substantive" in a
particular situation, so that the lex loci delicti governs.7 It seems clear that
the incapacity of a wife to sue her husband was originally a procedural matter,
arising out of the common law requirement thaf a husband join with his wife
in suits for tortious injuries to the latter.8 Since a person could not'be both
plaintiff and defendant, the suit became impossible as a matter of procedure.
In many states, where the procedural difficulty has been eliminated through
statutory amendments, wives are now enabled to sue their husbands in tort;0
some states, however, with similar statutes, still refuse to allow the suit, basing
the decision in part on the desire to preserve harmony in the, home.10  It
would not have been unwarranted to hold that the incapacity of a spouse to
sue was a procedural rule of Maine that had no effect on the New Hampshire
courts. But courts have not so treated the cases. Rather, they consider
the relationship as a substantive defense that would be available in the place
of the accident, and therefore controlling in the forum, which must look to
the law of the place of injury in order to determine the rights of the parties."
An exception to the rule that the lex loci delicti governs, however, is said to
be that the forum will not enforce a "foreign right" which is in contravention
of the public policy of the state where the suit is brought.1 2  If a state does
have the power, despite the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,
to refuse to enforce a "right"-or, as in the instant case, to recognize a
'defense-arising in another stateIn it seems that New Hampshire here failed
to take advantage of an opportunity to exercise such power to good purpose.
6. Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, 127 Iowa 153, 161, 98 14. W. 918, 922,
102 N. W. 836 (1904); Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919); Powell
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017 (1907); GooDRIcer, op. cit.
supra note 5, § 81. See Cook, "Substance' and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 333.
7. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962, 964 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), noted in (1931) 31 COL,
L. REy. 885; Precourt v. Driscoll, 85 N. H. 280, 157 At. 525 (1931), noted in (1931) 16
knIw. L. REv. 586, (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 911; GooDRIcU, op. cit. supra note, 5, § 91."8. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877); MeCurdy, Torts between Persons in
Domestic Relation (1930) 43 HAxv. L. Rav. 1030, 1033.
" 9. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 AtI. 889 (1914); Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566,
118 S. E. 9 (1923); Comment (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 315.
10. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 618 (1910); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me.
304, 308 (1877); and discussion in McCurdy, supra note 8. The wording of the Maine
statute, Ma. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 74, § 5, is very similar to that of the New Hampshire
statute, N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) c. 288, § 2.
11. See Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 253, 234 N. W. 342, 343 (1931); RESTATE-
rxTr, CoNr.cr oF LAWS (1934) § 388.
12. See Howard'v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 579, 158 S. E. 101, 104 (1931); Loucks
V. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 107, 120 N. E. 198, 200 (1918); GOoDRICr, Op. Cit,
supra note 5, § 7.
13. Sbme doubt has been raised as to the existence of this power. Cf. Kenney v.
Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U. S. 411, 415 (1920). See Beach,
Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, (1918) 27 YALF L. .. 656.
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By this decision a Maine rule, which has been declared by the New Hampshire
legislature and courts not to be their policy, made it possible for a New
Hampshire husband negligently and with impunity to injure another New
Hampshire citizen, his wife, through conduct that would be actionable in
New Hampshire.' 4 This recognition of a Maine substantive defense contrary
to New Hampshire public policy appears to be an extreme application of the
concept that "comity" requires a court to recognize the law of another jur-
isdiction,'15 and, incidentally, to be a complete negation of the idea that law
is "territorial" and of no effect outside the borders of its own jurisdictionY
3
Furthermore, it is in effect a recognition of the converse of the "obligatio"
theory, since it holds that where the lex loci delicti gives no enforceable right,
the plaintiff does not "own something" which the forum can "help him to
get."17
Generally the theories presented in the field of the conflict of laws involve
some fundamental concept of the sphere of the effectiveness of the laws of any
jurisdiction.' 8 Individual cases are supposed to be decided by a process of
deductive reasoning from these theories. On the other hand, some writers
have presented arguments in favor of the use of inductive reasoning to discover
first what the courts have done and then to evolve general categories for the
situations that arise.' 9 These discussions seldom consider what appears to be
a vital part of the problem, namely, the purpose of the rule of law involved
in the case. Professor Cook, however, has argued that the problem of de-
termining whether a matter is substantive law or procedure in conflicts cases
should be decided with regard to the nature of the case at hand and the purpose
of the rule in such a case, pointing out that it is socially desirable sometimes
14. The policy is shown by the statute, N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 283, § 2, and deci-
sions. See Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4, 95 AUt. 657 (1915).
But d. dicta in Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 580, 158 S. E. 101, 104 (1931), to
the effect that this is not "unjust or injurious" to North Carolinians. But see Hu&orn
v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927) (to allow a nurse to sue the parent
of an infant tortfeasor in California courts would be "inimical to the welfare of our citizens
and subversive of plain justice"--though the suit would lie in Hawaii, where the accident
occurred).
This Comment attempts to deal solely with the question of "what law governs" and to
confine the discussion of social policy involved to the conflict of laws aspect of the cas.
No attempt is here made to consider in detail the important question of the merits of
intra-family suits arising out of automobile accidents, or the fact that they are often
collusive schemes to collect from insurance companies. The whole question of comp-nsation
for injuries sustained through automobile accidents appears to be an increasing prob!em
for the legislatures.
15. See Beach, supra note 13.
16. See Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 578, 158 S. E. 101, 103 (1931); Srony, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 20.
17. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 120 N. E. 193, 201 (1913); Bnin,
TREATSE o- = COsmLcr or LAWS (1916) §§ 73-78.
18. Bssr.z, id. at c. IV; SroRY, op. cit. supra note 5, c. Ir.
19. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of thMe Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 Y=. L. J.
457; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YA L. J.
736. Cf. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933) 47 Hn%,. L. REv. 173.
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to apply the lex loci delicti in order to further the social purpose of a rule,
which might generally be considered "procedural."20
Tort rules of law, like criminal laws, are recognized as rules of conduct for
those subject to the jurisdiction promulgating them. In both cases the state
is simply attempting to set standards of conduct for all who enter its borders. 1
It is clear, therefore, that these rules ought not to operate outside the boun-
daries of the state whose rules they are, or a person might find himself subject
to two antithetical rules of conduct. Such would be the case, for instance,
if one state, mindful primarily of the safety of persons, required all trucks and
buses to have solid tire wheels, while a neighboring state required pneumatic
tires on the same vehicles in order to preserve its road surfaces. There might
be both a civil and criminal liability attached for failure to obey.P2
Decisions of cases involving the laws of several jurisdictions might reach
more desirable results if this basic idea of the purpose of tort rules were
borne in mind. Generally, the familiar rule that the law of the place of the
accident governs the rights of the parties will carry out the purpose of the
rules. The tortfeasor was supposedly held to have knowledge of the standards
of conduct set by the place in which he was when he did the act that resulted
in the injury, and only a deviation from those standards should render him
liable for damages. However, if the tortfeasor does an act in one state which
results in injury in another state, under established doctrine the law of the
place of impact governs the rights.2s This might result in holding a person to
a standard of conduct of a state whose laws he is not presumed to know and
which might conflict with the standard established in the state where he acted.
In deciding tort cases involving a conflict of laws by examining the purpose
of the applicable rules, however, it is important to distinguish between rules
that are intended to regulate and establish standards of conduct, and those
with some different purpose. Clearly, if failure to do an affirmative act that
a state declares must be done is declared to be negligence per se, or to give
rise to a presumption of negligence, such a rule is intended to add a greater
civil liability for disobedience and to make people more likely to adhere to
the standard. Failure to have adequate lights on a vehicle, excessive speed,
failure to keep to the right side of the road, or to "stop, look and listen" all
20. Cook, sipra, note 6.
21. See Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 COL. L. RVy. 202, 207:
... As (defendant) was in Massachusetts apparently he owed obedience to the law
there and not to that of New Hampshire."
It is very possible that tort rules do not induce persons consciously to act In a certain
manner. This becomes more true when the potential tortfeaser is protected by insurance.
However, the natural desire of all persons to avoid accidents will undoubtedly induce
them to act in the way that other people expect-the way the "ordinarily prudent man"
would act. Also, some insured persons may realize that the fewer the accidents, the lower
will be insurance rates.
22. See Ewell v. Cardinal, 53 R. I. 469, 167 Atl. 533 (1933); Peters, Death on the
Highway, (1935) 93 FORUM 79, 179.
23. Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. Rr., 78 N. H. 553, 558, 103 Atl,
263, 266 (1918) ; GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra note 5, § 93.
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may be in this category.24 However, many of the rules often connected with
tort actions have no relation to the intention of the state to set up standards
of conduct. For instance, the measure of damages or the limit of liability
can hardly be said to be part of an attempt to regulate conduct of persons,'
to prevent certain undesirable behavior, or to encourage adherence to the stand-
ards thought proper. These are matters that concern parties only after the
operative facts have occurred; they can more truly be said to "affect the rem-
edy" which is available to one whose "right" has been infringed, or who has
acquired a right to some reparation.
Questions of capacity to sue and be sued are not related to the regulation of
conduct of people. It can hardly be maintained that rules preventing spouses
from suing each other in some jurisdictions, or children from suing parents in
tort, or slaves from suing anyone, license the persons who are thereby exempted
from liability to be unreservedly negligent or malicious as to the incapacitated
parties. 26 It is obviously not true that a wife even in Maine is outside the
sphere of the husband's duty to act as an ordinarily prudent man, for instance,
within the doctrine of the Palsgraj case.27 The same judge who decided that
case has said, in sustaining a suit by a wife against her negligent husband's
employer, that the "act of the husband was nonetheless unlawful because done
by the husband," even though a suit against him would have failed.29
There remains the problem of determining which jurisdiction's rules should
24. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 168, 126 N. E. 814, 815 (1920) (ab.ence of rear
light held negligence per se); Hiatt v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co, 303 Mo. 77,
102, 271 S. W. 806, 812 (1925) (railroad presumed to be negligent by virtue of the occur-
rence of an accident); Beacham v. Proprietors of Portsmouth Bridge, 6S N. H. 382, 40 At].
1066 (1895) (illegal Sunday travel in Massachusetts held a good defense in a tort suit);
RIETATm=, Coa=cr or LAWS (1934) § 380; cf. Davis Cabs, Inc. v. Evans, 42 Ohio
App. 493, 182 N. E. 327 (1932) (rule as to the effect of excessive speed held "remedial"),
noted in (1932) 42 YAr. L. J. 286.
25. See, for instance, CoNN. Gme. STAT. (1930) 5987, which limits the recovery in
wrongful death actions to $10,000. The primary aim of such a statute is to prevent out-
rageous recoveries, not to discourage accidents. It is true, however, that some statutes
provide for increased liabilities, as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, with its triple damages
section. Such a statute is dearly penal and is aimed at governing conduct.
26. See Polydore v. Prince, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11257, p. 95 (D. Mle. 1837) (a slave who
would have had no standing in court of jurisdiction creating his status is permitted to sue
in United States court for tort committed at sea).
27. Pasgraf v. Long Island Rr. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928). See Ewel
v. Cardinal, 53 R. I. 469, 167 At. 533 (1933), where the lack of registration of plaintiW-s
car defeated his suit because Massachusetts allows recovery in such a case only if the
defendant is wilfully and wantonly negligent.
28. Cardozo, C. J., in Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 43, 164 N. E. 42,
256, (1928).
It is not always so easy to determine ex post facto which rules are guides to conduct and
which are related solely to procedure. For instance, under which head should one put
the New York rule that an owner is liable for all damages caused by his automobile while
driven with his permission? Is it aimed primarily at making owners careful in lendin3
cars, or at increasing the chances for recovery by an injured person? Is a non-reident
owner ' presumed" to know the law of the state in which his automobile goes with his
permission? In Young v. Masc4 289 U. S. 253 (1933), the owner was held liab!e. Se
(1934) 47 Haav. L. Rlv. 349. Cf. Lee v. Chamberlain, 84 N. H. 182, 148 At. 466 (1929)
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apply in a tort case to the questions not involving standards of 
conduct. In
each situation the court of the forum may apply the law of 
the jurisdiction
'which has the greatest interest in securing conformity with the particular 
rule
in issue. Also, it may consider the general public policy of such rules through-
out the United States, and reach a decision that will tend to bring greater
national uniformity.2 9
Statutes of limitations are never intended to guide persons in their conduct
until after the operative facts of a case have occurred, and consideration of
the real purpose that they are intended to fulfill when they do become material
is necessary before a satisfactory decision can be made on the question of which
statute should govern. Generally the purpose of the statute is to protect
defendants from the risk of indefinitely prolonged liability.
30 The purpose
of the statute would generally best be served by the application of the law of
the state of residence of the defendant regardless of where the suit arises.
However, if the transaction occurred in a state other than the residence of
the defendant or the forum, application of the law of the place of the transac-
tion would probably bring about the desired result with the greatest justice
to the parties, since both can be held to knowledge of the law of that juris-
diction. If there is a time limitation in the statute creating the substantive
right involved, that period ought to be applied wherever the suit is brought in
order to further the policy of that statute.P
1 If the time limit is intended to
prevent delay of the final disposal of an estate, for instance, of a deceased tort-
feasor, then clearly the statute of the jurisdiction administering the estate
should be used, since that is the one which declares the policy of the state on
that matter.3 2 There seems to be no good reason why any other state should
be able to prolong or diminish the time merely because some of the facts
occurred there. Similarly, the policy of the state having jurisdiction of a
decedent's estate should determine whether or not tort actions by or against
the deceased should survive his death. It is the problem of that state to
settle the estates and determine its policy regarding conflicting interests of dis-
(Mass. "guest" statute, limiting recovery by a guest to cases where the driver was guilty
of gross negligence, held to apply where the accident occurred in Massachusetts and suit
was brought in New Hampshire. This statute was intended to prevent collusive suits in
Massachusetts, not to guide the driver's conduct); Redfern v. Redfern, 212 Iowa 454, 236
N. W. 399 (1931); Hall v. Hamel, 244 Mass. 464, 138 N. E. 925 (1923); Loranger v. Nadeau,
215 Cal. 362, 10 P. (2d) 63 (1932).
29. Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in the Conflict of Laws (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 1082.
30. The fact that it generally does not run if the defendant is out of the jurisdiction
merely exhibits a solicitude on the part of the state for creditors within its borders, taking
the form of a definitely ascertainable extension of the limitation period in certain circum
stances. See Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 61 F. 733, 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894).
31. See Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 620 (190-4)
(holding that the limitation attached to wrongful death statute applies in all cases) ; Jack-
son v. 'Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 X. Y. 316, 319, 90 N. E. 953, 955 (1910); Saloshln v,
Houle, 85 N. H. 126, 155 At. 47 (1931). Contra: Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153
AtI. 346 (1931), noted in (1931) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 1112; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198
N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930).
32.- See RE~sTATE SzwT, ComLICr or LAWS (1934) § 498.
tributees or legatees and third parties and it should have final authority to
permit such actions or bar them.P But the existence in the state where the
transaction occurred of a special court or method of administering certain casEs
hardly seems to be a necessary part of the case if it arises in another forum-,
As long as the defendant deviated from the standard set up in the place of the
transaction, the plaintiff should have his recovery in whatever form it is avail-
able where he sues, for the procedure provided is simply a matter of adminis-
trative convenience of the forum. The form of remedy is a matter of
procedure.35
In suits involving members of a family, assuming that there is no longer
the common law fiction of spousal unity which required a husband to be joined
with a wife, the principal reason given for denying the action is that it would
tend to disrupt the harmony of the home. It is generally assumed that the
law of the domicile governs questions of domestic relations, 0 and the conclu-
sion that domestic harmony is of importance only to the jurisdiction of domicile
seems reasonable. If that state does not fear discord among the families within
its borders,3 7 then it hardly seems to be the concern of other states, whose
inhabitants theoretically will not be affected by what occurs outside the borders
of their "insulated chambers." In Gray v. Gray no public policy of New
Hampshire would be disturbed by permitting the suit. The fear of Maine
courts that there would be an increase of domestic discord if such suits were
allowed must be limited to a fear of increased discord in Maine, as it is theoret-
ically no legal concern of Maine's courts that New Hampshire families are
broken up. Much as they dislike these suits, Maine courts would probably
give a judgment for plaintiff if the facts of the case were exactly reversed, the
accident occurring in New Hampshire with the parties domiciled in Maine.P
However, in that event, Maine might well refuse to permit the action, if it had
regard to the announced foundation of the rule prohibiting inter-spousal suits,
pointing out that it had a direct interest in preventing such discord as it thinks
would be engendered by suits between spouses domiciled in Maine.
33. Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (C. C. D. Conn. 1896). Contra: Chubbuck v.
Holloway, 182 Allan. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931) ; Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N. J. L. 462,
166 AtL 119 (1933), R STATE H T, Co-mticr or LIws (1934) § 390. See Orr v. Ahern, 107
Conn. 174, 139 At. 691 (1928), noted in (1928) 28 COL. L. Rnv. 498; (1928) 26 McmL L.
Ray. 932; (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 996.
34. But see Slater v. Mexican Natl Rr. Co., 194 U. S. 120 (1904); Logan v. Mo. Valley
Bridge & Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S. W. 21 (1923); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
35. See Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231; Lorenzen, Tort Liablity and the Car-
flid of Laws (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 483; Corwin, The "Full Fith and Credit" Clause, (1933)
81 U. or PA. L. REv. 371.
36. GooDRIch, op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 112, 122, 123, 136; Comment (1932) 16 Mrna. L.
REv. 172. See notes on Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (1931), (1931) 31
CoL. L. REv. 884; (1931) 29 Mcn. L. REv. 1072; (1931) 44 HAnv. L. R v. 1133.
37. ... and does not fear collusion against insurance companies...
38. If the accident had occurred in New Hampshire, even Maine residents would probably
contrive to have the suit brought in the former state and thereby avoid any question of
the right of a wife to sue her husband. This is based on the probably reasonable assumption
that such suits are generally simply a method whereby an insurance company is being made
to pay for the accident.
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